Monday, March 31, 2014

Existential eisegesis


A couple of responses are possible. First, some Arminians would say (like some Reformed theologians!) that the story of the fall in Genesis 3 is “saga,” not literal description of what happened in some geographical location during some datable time period past. Its point is theological, not historical. It is history-like without likely being history. To those who object that that is a “liberal” interpretation I ask if they believe Satan appeared to Adam and Eve as a literal serpent and, if so, which species of serpent (reduction ad absurdum)? And I ask if they believe the “fruit” of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was literal fruit and, if so, what kind? In other words, few people other than the most literally minded fundamentalists interpret every aspect of the story literally. Many Reformed and Arminian theologians consider Genesis 3 to be a narrative about us—humanity—and our existential condition. In that interpretation, God most certainly did not literally “put” Satan in the garden; the serpent represents (for example) the tension between finitude and freedom (Kierkegaard, Niebuhr, et al.). 
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2014/03/is-the-arminian-god-good/

Several issues:

i) The duty of an interpreter is not, in the first place, to ask what he himself finds believable, but what the author and his target audience found believable. An interpreter is supposed to assume the viewpoint of the narrator (and the implied reader) for purposes of exegesis. Whether he personally considers to be credible is irrelevant to exegesis. 

Of course, the Bible is supposed to obligate the reader. 

ii) If the action in Eden is "not literal description of what happened in some geographical location during some datable time period past," is there any reason to assume the call of Abraham (Gen 12) or the call of Moses (Exod 3) is a "literal description of what happened in some geographical location during some datable time period past"?

To ask if the Tempter is a literal serpent is akin to asking if the bronze serpent is a literal snake. Or the Uraeus in Pharaoh's crown. No. But the bronze serpent wasn't just a metaphor. It was a physical symbol, standing for something else. Same thing with the Uraeus. A concrete representation. Objects that occupy real time and real space. 

iii) So Kierkegaard and Niebuhr think the serpent represents the tension between finitude and freedom. Who cares? What reason is there to think that's how the narrator understood the serpent?  

iv) Why does Olson think it's absurd to ask what kind of fruit the Edenic trees produced? It's useless to ask, in the sense that the account doesn't furnish that specific information. But why think that's a silly question to the narrator or the original audience?  

v) What Reformed theologians think Gen 2-3 is reducible to an Everyman parable? 

3 comments:

  1. I wonder if Olson questions whether Jesus was tempted to turn literal stones into literal bread or not.

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  2. How does pressing for the species of the snake reduce the issue to absurdity? Unless you already find the idea of a literal snake absurd, in which case talk about species is a redundancy.

    On a side note - I think a creation scientist, if he did believe the snake was literal (and somehow possessed or superimposed by Satan), would say there was only ONE type of snake. Those proto-"kinds" they always talk about, which are rich in their actual potential to diversify into all the species we see today.

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  3. True, it's no more or less "absurd" than sticks changing into snakes and vice versa in Exod 7. Absurd if one's a naturalistic. Not absurd of one's a supernaturalist.

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