Wednesday, June 17, 2009

The Fallacies of Arminian Apologetics – Fallacy #1

According to Thibodaux:

Calvinists often pose questions along the lines of, “If 2 people are given the same grace, why does one receives it and another reject it?” This question was popularized on the internet by John Hendryx at monergism.com, who in one rendition of this particular fallacy states: “If prevenient grace places us in a neutral state, then what motivates one man to believe and not another? … What principle in him made him choose what he did?” [A Prayer That a Synergist Won't Pray (An Open Challenge to All Synergists), John Hendryx]
The problem:
Hendryx’s wording is very telling, he asks ‘what made him choose?’, when the defining property of a libertarian decision is that nothing caused it to be one way or another except the person’s own will. While free will certainly is subject to influence, if some external principle coerced, impelled, or simply necessitated a specific decision, then the choice could no longer be called ‘libertarian.’
To break down Hendryx’s question:
The context (note the title I listed above) is that Hendryx is addressing the question to Synergists (people like myself who believe that there are at least some non-necessitated choices), trying to show what he perceives as problems in our beliefs. His putting forth of the question, “What principle in him made him choose what he did?”, amounts to him asking what necessitates our decisions, since anything that makes someone choose a specific way would constitute necessitation of that choice.
So given that,
1. The question is posed to people who believe in libertarian (non-necessitated) decisions
2. The question challenges the libertarian view by asking what necessitates peoples’ specific choices
Hendryx’s question effectively boils down to him asking,
“What necessitates choices that aren’t necessitated?”
This line of questioning is not only logically absurd, but also requires assuming that all of our decisions must be necessitated, when that is in fact the proposition he is trying to prove. This fallacy is more formally known as ‘begging the question,’ a form of circular reasoning.


http://arminianperspectives.wordpress.com/2009/06/12/the-fallacies-of-calvinist-apologetics-fallacy-1-if-we-have-libertarian-free-will-what-makes-us-choose-one-way-or-the-other/

Thibodaux exhibits a very simplistic grasp of libertarian action theory. And his commenters suffer from the same simplistic grasp.

Let’s quote from a contemporary analysis which illustrates some of the complexities and difficulties of libertarianism:

“Some libertarian accounts require that a free decision or other free action have no cause at all; some require that it either have no cause or be only nondeterministically caused by other events. Since both such views place no positive causal requirements on free action, we may call them ‘noncausal accounts.’ (They are sometimes called ‘simple indeterminist views.’),” R. Clarke, “Libertarian Views: Critical Survey of Noncausal and Event-Causal Accounts of Free Agency,” R. Kane, ed. The Oxford Handbook of Freewill (Oxford 2005, 356.

“Two (related) main problems arise from libertarian accounts of this sort: both are problems, in the first instance, for noncausal accounts of action. The first concerns control. Performing an action, even acting unfreely, is exercising some variety of active control over one’s behavior; acting freely is exercising an especially valuable variety of active control. A theory of action, whether of specifically free action or not, ought to say what the pertinent variety of control is or in what it consists. It is questionable whether noncausal views have an adequate account to offer at this point,” ibid. 357-358.

“The second main problem concerns rationality. Acting freely is acting with a capacity for rational self-governance and determining, oneself, whether and how one exercises that capacity on a given occasion. Hence it must be possible for a free action to be an action performed for a certain reason, an action for which there is a rational explanation. Again, it is questionable whether noncausal views can proved adequate accounts of these phenomena,” ibid., 358.

“Consider first the matter of control. An obvious candidate for an account here is that an agent’s exercising active control consists in her action’s being caused, in an appropriate way, by her, or by certain events involving her, such as her having certain beliefs and desires or a certain intention. Since noncausal accounts reject this type of view, what alternatives are available?” ibid. 358.

“McCann rejects causal construals of it, but since he offers no substantive alternative, the exercise of active control is left something of a mystery. The resulting view, in my judgment, falls short as account of action (and hence of free action) because it provides no positive account of the crucial phenomenon,” ibid. 359.

“When it comes to acting for certain reasons and to rational explanation, again obvious candidates for accounts of the phenomena invoke causation: an agent acts for a certain reason only if the agent’s having the corresponding reason-state (such as a desire) causes, in an appropriate way, the agent’s behavior, and citing a reason-state contributes to a rational explanation of an action only if the agent’s having that reason-state caused, in an appropriate way, the action. Proponents of noncausal libertarian views reject such proposals,” ibid. 359-360.

This is just a sample. Clarke runs through a number of noncausal and event-causal strategies to make libertarian action theory satisfy the conditions of control and rationality. He draws attention to various deficiencies of among competing versions.

Thibodaux is welcome to present a version of libertarianism which sidesteps all these pitfalls. For example, how does he avoid the argument from luck?

11 comments:

  1. Dear Steve,

    Last we spoke, I believe you mentioned you thought God has LFW. How do you avoid the argument from luck?

    The quotes you provide argue against non-causal accounts and Josh provided a causal account: "nothing caused it to be one way or another except the person’s own will". As such, perhaps Clarke's comments about Oconner would be more approprate then his comments about McCann.

    God be with you,
    Dan

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  2. A causal account fails to salvage Josh's position from the objection of Hendryx. Hendryx asked what "motives" a human agent to believe X, or what principle "in him" makes him choose the way he does.

    Those would be causal factors, but factors internal to the agent. If Josh espouses a causal account of libertarianism, then he can't object to the way in which Hendryx framed the question.

    And once you endorse a causal account, then that only pushes the question back a step. Did the agent choose to have that belief, intention, or desire which, in turn, causes him to make other choices? If he didn't choose what causes him to make other choices, then the incentive for libertarianism is lost.

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  3. No, I've repeatedly said that God's freedom is sui generis. It doesn't fall into either model of human agent theory, whether libertarian or determinist.

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  4. Two additional problems:

    i) If he's defining the will as the faculty that chooses, then it's tautologous to say the will causes us to choose.

    ii) Moreover, if he's defining will in contrast to reasons, such that our reasons don't cause us to choose, but only a sheer will, then he loses the element of rationality which is a standard condition of free choice even by libertarian criteria.

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  5. Steve,

    That's what I was wondering about re: your last two points.

    If there is not reason or motive for ones choice is it still a choice? Wouldn't the action just be a random action?

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  6. Yes, on this view, freedom of choice is like a raffle. You pick a ticket out of the rotating basket at random.

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  7. I think Hendryx simply has the Arminian over a barrel here and this is only one of two reactions they can take and maintain their system.

    Either they must admit that the reason they're saved is that they earned it through their goodness or choice, or they can attempt to wiggle out of answering as Thibodaux tries here.

    Thibodaux states: "the defining property of a libertarian decision is that nothing caused it to be one way or another except the person’s own will"... that's like answering that that the "ice cream is vanilla" when asked where it came from. We know it's vanilla, we asked from whence it came.

    To claim that "nothing caused it to be one way or the other" fails to grasp that the "person's own will" is never truly free in a libertarian sense, that is, there are always external (and internal) forces at work on that will. Why does Thibodaux eat the ice cream? Cause he likes vanilla... his appreciation of the flavor of vanilla is one reason he ate it.

    We all know that, in Thibodaux's worldview, he is saved is because he willed it to be... the question stands, but why? Why did he will it to be whereas others with the same exact opportunity and prevenient grace reject?

    Thibodaux must answer the question, for it is at the heart of the synergism vs monergism debate. Did he 'accept' because he was more spiritual, more holy or lucky? What was it about him that caused him to choose?

    He cannot say that equal opportunity wasn't given, for is that not the foundation of their supposed system... fairness?

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  8. Hi Steve,

    God's freedom is sui generis. It doesn't fall into either model of human agent theory, whether libertarian or determinist.

    Determinate and indeterminate seem like mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories. Are you suggesting there is some third category we don't know about or perhaps this is a logical paradox?

    God be with you,
    Dan

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  9. GODISMYJUDGE SAID:

    “Determinate and indeterminate seem like mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories. Are you suggesting there is some third category we don't know about or perhaps this is a logical paradox?”

    i) Nothing predetermines God. And nothing predetermines what he will do. Rather, his choices result in predeterminate outcomes.

    ii) Human agents must act according to the situation in which they find themselves. Much of the time they don’t get to choose their circumstances. Much of the time that’s something determined by forces beyond their control.

    By contrast, God is never confronted with a set of preexisting circumstances. Rather, God chooses the circumstances.

    iii) Although there’s nothing which predetermines what God will do, there are some things which God can’t do due to his wisdom and goodness.

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  10. Hi Steve,

    Your response leads me to believe you move away from exhaustive determinism. Is there something holding you back from affirming God's choices could have been otherwise (i.e. affirming God has LFW)?

    In one sense agree with your circumstances comment, but I have always thought God's nature yields various possible worlds (aka natural knowledge) and He chooses one of them. Thus God's 'options' are natural not volitional. I am not sure if your comment was intended to say the possible worlds themselves are a product of His choice or not.

    God be with you,
    Dan

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  11. GODISMYJUDGE SAID:

    “Your response leads me to believe you move away from exhaustive determinism.”

    You’re confusing two different issues. God’s exhaustive predetermination of the future doesn’t mean that God’s own choices are predetermined. Rather, God’s choices (exhaustively) predetermine the future. It’s the difference between:

    i) An agent is predetermined to do X

    And:

    ii) An agent predetermines X

    Why is that elementary distinction so difficult for you to absorb?

    God’s actions are not predetermined. Rather, his actions predetermine the state of the world.

    God is necessary, the world is contingent.

    “Is there something holding you back from affirming God's choices could have been otherwise (i.e. affirming God has LFW)?”

    I’ve said on many occasions that God could have done otherwise. That’s not a sufficient definition of libertarian freedom.

    i) Libertarian freedom doesn’t merely mean freedom to do otherwise, but freedom to do otherwise under the same circumstances. But God isn’t choosing for a set of preexisting circumstances. Rather, divine choice is responsible for whatever concrete circumstances come into being.

    ii) Likewise, the freedom to do otherwise, in and of itself, would include the freedom to choose either good or evil. That’s inapplicable to God.

    “In one sense agree with your circumstances comment, but I have always thought God's nature yields various possible worlds (aka natural knowledge) and He chooses one of them. Thus God's 'options' are natural not volitional. I am not sure if your comment was intended to say the possible worlds themselves are a product of His choice or not.”

    As I’ve said before, possible worlds are a way of expressing what God could possibility do, given his omnipotence. He chooses which possible world to instantiate given his self-knowledge of his own omnipotence.

    Once again, that’s hardly comparable to human freedom, even if you attribute libertarian freedom to human beings–which I don’t.

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